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Article 4

Spencer: Is Not This Real?

Is Not This Real?

Joseph M. Spencer

The following essay is a slightly revised version of a talk originally delivered
at Brigham Young University on November 29, 2018, as part of the Wheatley Institution’s semiannual Reason for Hope lecture series.

L

atter-day Saints often take Korihor, the infamous Nephite anti-Christ,
to be a fool, someone perhaps rightly struck dumb for stupidly
demanding signs when he knew better. After all, he self-contradictorily
trusted “an angel” who told him that “there is no God” (Alma 30:53).
One popular commentary remarks: “Wickedness does not promote
rational thought!”1
Such an approach to Korihor is good fun, perhaps, but it fails to comprehend Korihor’s place in the Book of Mormon. Presumably, his voice
is present in the narrative for a reason. Should we not assume that Mormon, as author of the Book of Alma, wishes us to reflect on Korihor’s
critique of Nephite Christian faith? We are presented with Korihor’s own
words in Alma 30, despite the fact that these words led many Nephite
Christians into serious spiritual error. True, as we read on, we are told
of Korihor’s unseemly demise and reminded by Mormon that such is
“the end of him who perverteth the ways of the Lord” (Alma 30:60). But
this end result does not, I think, lessen the fact that Mormon gives us
Korihor’s actual words and arguments. It seems we are being asked to
think through them.
1. David J. Ridges, Your Study of the Book of Mormon Made Easier, Part Two:
Mosiah through Alma (Springville, Utah: Cedar Fort, 2007), 280.
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Not only are we being asked to think through Korihor’s words, but
we are arguably also being asked to watch as Alma thinks through them.
As I will show, it seems Alma is at first caught off guard by Korihor
and that it takes him awhile to sort out how to respond to the critique.
Though God gets involved in the situation with Korihor, which settles
affairs to some degree (see Alma 30:49–50), this resolution does not
seem to leave Alma settled in his mind and spirit. And so he works
out a complex response to Korihor’s critique over the course of several
chapters. In the following pages, I wish to probe Korihor’s appraisal of
Nephite Christian devotion, sorting out the basic stakes of his argument,
and then I wish to look at how Alma slowly and belatedly develops a full
response to Korihor.
Before beginning in earnest, I should explain briefly why I believe
this analysis is worth pursuing. The question at the heart of the exchange
between Korihor and Alma concerns knowledge, what Alma calls the
real (Alma 32:35). And this question of knowledge seems to be a concern many in The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints have right
now. Is it really possible to know the truth of the Restoration? Some
skeptically ask if people just talk about knowing religious truths because
they’re either naïve or opportunistic—either following blindly without
having asked any hard questions or being consciously inauthentic to
get along in a culture that is obsessed with certainty. Is there any space
today for knowledge, especially in religious contexts?
Well, let us begin with Korihor.
According to the text, Korihor’s critique of Nephite Christian devotion derives from a kind of cynicism. That is, behind his more strictly
philosophical criticisms lies a suspicion that the whole of Nephite Christianity was created by “ancient priests” who sought “power and authority,” ultimately in the hopes of getting gain (Alma 30:23). These priests,
he claims, figured out that they could prevent people from “enjoy[ing]
their rights and privileges” or “mak[ing] use of that which is their own”
by providing a system of “ordinances and performances” overseen by
individuals with immense social capital: people others would be naturally afraid to “offend” (30:23, 27–28).
What corruptly shields these priests from criticism, according to
Korihor, is a set of unverifiable things: “traditions,” “dreams,” “whims,”
“visions,” and “pretended mysteries” (30:28). Such is Korihor’s institutional critique of Alma’s church. Now, it strikes me as deeply interesting
that Alma does not bother himself much with these accusations, though
they apparently lie at the root of Korihor’s attitude. Alma dismisses
them as untrue with a simple wave of the hand (see 30:34–35). What
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol58/iss2/4
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interests Alma, it seems, is not Korihor’s institutional critique, especially
when it sets forth its own unverifiable claims. In Alma’s view, all this is
apparently superficial, and so he gives his attention primarily to Korihor’s philosophical criticisms about whether Nephite Christian claims
are true and how one comes to know the truth. He addresses these
issues in detail and at length.
I want, though, to pause for a moment on the fact that Alma prioritizes questions of knowledge over questions of authority, on the fact that
he privileges philosophical questions over what might be called ethical questions. This prioritization seems noteworthy for today’s context
because the past decade or so has seen, in the larger culture surrounding
the Church, an inversion of Alma’s priorities. In other words, at least
from my own observation, those struggling with or in fact leaving the
Church tend (let me emphasize that this is only a tendency) to begin
with and seldom get beyond suspicions about the ethical nature of the
institution.
I refer here not only to worries about the Church’s stance on certain political or social issues but also to the oft-asserted claim that the
Church has hidden historical or financial information from its membership. I do not mean to deny that such concerns are important, but I
think I have often felt like Alma when encountering these concerns. It
seems to me that most such questions about the Church as an institution are only important if one begins from the conviction that there is
something real at work in the Restoration. Truth first, ethics later. This
is the position I see Alma taking. He wants to address matters of truth
and knowledge, and then, if necessary—and heaven knows it is necessary—we can discuss institutional ethics.
For the purposes of this essay, then, I wish to follow Alma’s lead and
move right to the heart of the matter: whether and how one can know
the truth. What are Korihor’s real criticisms?
Korihor seems to direct two precise points of criticism toward
Nephite Christian devotion. What allows the reader to identify them
is a bit of repetition. Twice Korihor speaks of things he calls “foolish,”
and twice he raises questions about what one “can know.” First, he
says that Nephite Christians are guided by “a foolish and a vain hope”
(30:13); second, he says that they trust the “foolish traditions of [their]
fathers” (30:14). Note how Korihor’s critiques point in opposing temporal directions: in hope, one looks to the future, while tradition comes to
a person from the past. Consequently, Korihor offers two distinct (but
related) objections. Regarding hope, he claims that “no man can know
of anything which is to come” (30:13)—future events are, by definition,
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2019
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unknowable; they are unavailable to present empirical experience. And
regarding tradition, he claims that one cannot have knowledge with any
“surety,” since “ye cannot know of things which ye do not see” (30:15)—
one cannot be certain about an account of a past event, since its very
pastness hides it from present empirical experience. Here, then, we have
two objections, but they converge on one overarching issue: knowledge.
Note that Korihor sees a connection between tradition and hope—
between “foolish” adherence to tradition and “foolish” anticipation of
things to come. “Ye look forward” to Christ, he says, but this “is the
effect of a frenzied mind; and this derangement of your minds comes
because of the traditions of your fathers” (30:16). Naïve adherence to
tradition distorts one’s thinking, and only such distorted thinking could
allow a person to think that the future is decided and clear.
Here, then, is Korihor’s critique of Nephite Christian devotion. First,
he does not like that its point of departure is tradition—so many reports
“handed down” (30:14) over centuries regarding extraordinary experiences and events about which one cannot be certain because they lie
inaccessibly in the past. Second, he does not like that Nephite Christians
derive hope from these uncertain traditions—a blind sense of security
about the future that, by definition, cannot be known. From Korihor’s
perspective, then, either Christians unwisely believe that they have
knowledge when they do not (the assumption being that knowledge
derives primarily from direct experience), or they are consciously oriented by something other than knowledge (such as faith) when they
ought to be oriented by knowledge. Korihor thus presents to Nephite
Christians a kind of dichotomy. Either you are deluded because you
think you know what you definitely do not know, or you are deluded
because you knowingly orient yourself to something other than knowledge. Either way, Nephite Christians are foolish, frenzied, and deranged.
Now that we have a clearer understanding of Korihor’s critique, we
can now straightforwardly state what Alma must do if he wishes to
address Korihor’s critique directly. He can (1) defend the idea that one
can know the truth about traditional claims or (2) explain why something other than knowledge, such as faith, is preferable as a point of
orientation. Fascinatingly, Alma does both. On the one hand, as I will
argue, he contends that Korihor has a fetishistic relationship to knowledge that is deeply problematic and that faith is a better place to start
(and end) than knowledge. Thus, he will effectively displace knowledge
as a core value, arguing, in fact, that faith not only is not lesser than
knowledge but also goes beyond knowledge and produces something
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of infinitely more value. On the other hand, he will also argue that one
nonetheless can know the truth of the Christ tradition—know it, in fact,
perfectly. I want to trace both of Alma’s points here.
I would like to make a preliminary point first, however. Strange as
it may seem, Alma does not offer his double response to Korihor’s critique until after Korihor’s death. Alma offers an immediate response to
Korihor’s onslaught in Alma 30, but he later develops a fuller and, in
my view, more mature response in Alma 32. From the perspective of
the later response, Alma may be said to offer only a weak defense when
talking with Korihor in person. This is perhaps disappointing in a certain way, but Alma’s experience is a common one. All too often, it is only
when it is already too late that we figure out what we should have said in
a socially complicated situation. This was apparently the case for Alma
on this occasion.
Although many have been deeply impressed and inspired by Alma’s
in-person exchange with Korihor, others may well wonder whether the
exchange is fully satisfying, especially in a twenty-first-century context.
Initially, Alma says just that he knows both that “there is a God, and also
that Christ shall come” (Alma 30:39). How does he justify this bold claim?
First, he makes a rhetorically clever move that nonetheless will never convince someone like Korihor. Alma says, “And now what evidence have
ye that there is no God, or that Christ cometh not? I say unto you that ye
have none, save it be your word only” (30:40). This statement is certainly
true, and maybe it keeps Korihor honest to some degree (he does, in
fact, retreat a bit, qualifying his criticism). But such a rhetorical move
will never convince an atheist or agnostic that someone can know spiritual truths with any certainty. Alma then goes further, stating, “I have
all things as a testimony that these things are true” (30:41). He explains,
“All things denote there is a God; yea, even the earth, and all things that
are upon the face of it, yea, and its motion, yea, and also all the planets
which move in their regular form do witness that there is a Supreme
Creator” (30:44). Here Alma offers a positive argument in his defense,
but, again, such an argument is unlikely to persuade an atheist or even
an agnostic—especially in the twenty-first century. A believer naturally
and rightly sees God’s hand in the order of the universe, but unbelievers
are seldom swayed by this kind of argument. In other words, what Alma
offers in response to Korihor within Alma 30 is an interesting defense of
the faith he himself already has, but it is not a satisfying reason to begin
believing. The response certainly does not work on Korihor, who persists
in disbelief until he has direct empirical evidence of God’s power (though,
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even then, Alma is left with the impression that Korihor has not changed
his mind; see 30:54–55). And of course, today any “argument from design”
(as arguments like Alma’s from Alma 30 are usually called) is even less
likely to compel belief because there are perfectly satisfying scientific
explanations for the ordered nature of the universe.2
It thus seems that Alma lacks a fully developed defense when he first
confronts Korihor’s skepticism. Really, he seems surprised at Korihor’s
belligerent atheism, which is unprecedented in recorded Nephite history. He counters his foe with a description of the orderliness in Creation, which he, as a believer, sees as divine, but he does not yet have
a way of explaining to someone like Korihor how a nonbeliever might
come to know the truth of a religious tradition.
Before moving on, I wish to make clear that I do not mean to cast
aspersions on Alma by gently criticizing his immediate response to Korihor. I think the text suggests that Alma himself felt he needed to develop
and elaborate on this first response: two chapters later, when Alma finds
himself preaching among the Zoramites, he seems still to be thinking
about Korihor, still attempting to work up a complete response to Korihor’s critique.3 The second he begins speaking to an eager audience of
the Zoramite poor, he speaks of “many who do say: If thou wilt show
unto us a sign from heaven, then we shall know of a surety; then we shall
believe” (32:17). Alma takes his opportunity to preach as an occasion, in
part, to work out a better answer to Korihor, who is already dead. Alma
apparently thinks Korihor’s questions need better answers than what
he provided before this point, and he has evidently developed what he
considers to be better responses. Thus, although the Zoramite poor do
not approach Alma in the same faithless way as Korihor, Alma, as it were,
asks them to sit down and listen to the sermon he wishes he could go
back and give to Korihor.
2. It is important to make clear that the believer is not wrong to see divine
influence in the immensely complex order of the world. The point is that nonbelievers have alternative explanations, with the consequence that the complexity and orderedness of the world in no way compels them to believe in a higher
power. I owe thanks to Ralph Hancock for helping me to see the importance of
clarifying this point.
3. When Joseph Smith dictated the text of the Book of Mormon to his scribes,
the chapters were longer than those in current editions. It seems important that
what are now Alma 30 and Alma 32 were actually within a single chapter, chapter XVI (now Alma 30–35), in the original Book of Mormon.
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Let us now take a look at Alma’s more mature response to Korihor’s
critique, found in Alma 32 rather than in Alma 30. Alma 32 is, of course,
a chapter with which Latter-day Saints are generally familiar. We are
not, however, familiar enough with it, in my view. I say that for a specific
reason. My experience is that Latter-day Saints tend to read Alma 32
as being about how faith is preparatory to and eventually replaced by
knowledge. When I ask students or average Church members about
Alma 32, their spontaneous response suggests that they read it as a treatise on how a lesser intellectual state (faith) eventually gives way to a
greater intellectual state (knowledge).4 I think this is a mistaken reading,
which I will try to show.5
Alma 32 famously contains a parable of sorts about what it means to
have faith. “Now,” Alma says, “we will compare the word unto a seed”
(32:28). Here already one must be careful. Thanks in part to a popular
Primary song, there is a common view of this text that is mistaken—a
view expressed when people speak of planting “a seed of faith.” But what
Alma compares to a seed is not faith; it is the word. Although Alma will
speak of faith being “increased” or of it “grow[ing] up” in the course of
his discussion (32:29), the point of his parable is not to illustrate how
faith grows from something small into something great. What grows
into a plant—and then into a tree—is the word. Faith in Alma’s discourse is just the trust that one places in the seed’s potential goodness
(and then later in its actual goodness). Alma appears to be less interested in encouraging his hearers to develop more or stronger faith than
in clarifying what faith in the word looks like.
Faith’s first task, according to Alma, is to plant the seed in what he
calls “an experiment” (32:27). He hopes that, at first, his hearers can
simply “believe in a manner that [they] can give place” for the word
(32:27). But what does “the word” refer to? God, Alma explains, “imparteth his word by angels” (32:23). And what is it that angels announce?
Alma urges his hearers to “begin to believe in the Son of God” and the
plan of salvation (33:22) and states his “desire that [they] shall plant this
4. It is important to note that published commentaries on and discussions
of Alma 32 tend to read the text in more nuanced ways.
5. I learned much about reading Alma 32 by participating in the 2008
Mormon Theology Seminar project, which focused on Alma 32. For the final
results of that project, see Adam S. Miller, ed., An Experiment on the Word:
Reading Alma 32 (Provo, Utah: Neal A. Maxwell Institute for Religious Scholarship, 2014).
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word in [their] hearts” (33:23, emphasis added). The word or seed is
thus the angelic announcement of the Son of God’s atoning work, however this may actually come to an individual. (Note that the word comes
to Alma’s hearers through him, rather than directly through angels.
That is, of course, how most of us receive the word. This is a point to
which I will return.)
Thus, what Alma asks first is that, with faith, his hearers give some
space for the word. Can we trust it enough to try an experiment with
it? Only once we have done that, Alma explains, can we start to track
what happens and therefore make a responsible decision regarding the
word’s goodness. Here is what is supposed to happen: “If it be a true seed,
or a good seed,” says Alma, “behold, it will begin to swell within your
breasts” (32:28). If the seed is good, it will swell. This is what good seeds
do when planted. Moisture in the soil causes a seed to swell before it then
sprouts and begins to grow. Alma claims that this metaphorical swelling is something one can feel. It has an immediate and undeniable effect
on us. “When you feel these swelling motions,” he says, “ye will begin to
say within yourselves—It must needs be that this is a good seed” (32:28).
Notice that Alma says that honest observers of their own unmistakably
internal experiences will start talking to themselves. They will conclude,
for themselves, that the seed is good. Why? “It swelleth, and sprouteth,
and beginneth to grow” (32:30), which is what every good seed does. A
sensible person, therefore, recognizing what is happening, will naturally
conclude that they have encountered a good seed. That is the metaphor in
the parable: as Alma says so simply: “If a seed groweth it is good” (32:32).
Now comes the key moment. Alma asks, “Are ye sure that this is a
good seed?” (32:31). His answer is simple and affirmative: absolutely!
Because a person is absolutely sure that the seed is good, he says, “ye
must needs know that the seed is good” (32:33). Here is the key word:
know. Having tried the experiment, one knows. Alma next asks if such
“knowledge” is “perfect” (32:34). And he again—perhaps against our
expectations this time—answers in the affirmative: “Yea, your knowledge is perfect in that thing” (32:34). Here Alma speaks of perfect
knowledge, of sure knowledge, of apparently undeniable knowledge. He
adds the following rhetorical question: “O then, is not this real?” (32:35).
Alma believes that anyone undertaking this experiment will have an
experience of something real, of something indelible, of something that
resists mere subjective interest.6 Here Alma sees the dawn of very real
6. That Alma speaks here of the real perhaps helps to explain why he stands
in awe before the complex order of nature. If the word of God can be known to
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol58/iss2/4
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knowledge, of an actual and discernible encounter with something, in
fact, reproducible and verifiable.
It is worth reflecting at least briefly on the kind of knowledge at stake
here. Alma elsewhere distinguishes between different kinds of knowledge—separating out, for example, “temporal” from “spiritual” knowledge,
or knowledge that is “of the carnal mind” from knowledge that is “of God”
(36:4). As for the sort of knowledge he has in mind in Alma 32 (and in Alma
36), it appears to be akin to what we would today call aesthetic knowledge.
This distinction seems clear from the fact that he ties knowledge directly
to taste. At the very moment he speaks of the real, he says that experience
of it amounts to having “tasted” it (32:35). (He speaks in a similar fashion
in Alma 36:26: “Many have been born of God, and have tasted as I have
tasted . . . ; therefore they do know of these things of which I have spoken, as I do know.”)7 Philosophers have long spoken of taste (not only as
one of the five senses but also as the taste that one cultivates) as a peculiar
sort of knowledge. As one thinker recently summed up the tradition, taste
simultaneously concerns “an excess of knowledge that is not known . . . but
that presents itself as pleasure” and “an excess of pleasure that is not enjoyed
. . . but that presents itself as knowledge.”8 Tasting something that is “sweet
above all that is sweet” (32:42) is an excessive experience, one that overflows
the categories of understanding but that, in a way, nonetheless produces a
kind of knowledge. One develops a taste for religious truth, and one knows
that it is good.
Alma is certainly convinced that the taste one develops for the word
is a form of real knowledge. But let us be clear: what one knows, surely
and perfectly, is pretty limited, according to Alma. He qualifies his talk
of perfect knowledge with the phrase “in that thing” (32:34). One can
know something in an absolute way, but all that Alma says we can know
is just this one thing: that the seed is good. Beyond that, does the person
be good and if one encounters the real in experimenting on the word, it should
follow that reality in general cannot be divorced from God and his goodness.
Of course, one must try the experiment and come to know the goodness of the
word before one can see the goodness of Creation. It thus remains necessary to
respond to the nonbeliever with a discussion about the experiment on the word
rather than with any argument of design.
7. I owe gratitude to John Tanner for drawing my attention to the epistemological importance of Alma’s references to taste, and to Matthew Wickman for
giving me the opportunity to think through the importance of the aesthetic in
Alma 32.
8. Giorgio Agamben, Taste, trans. Cooper Francis (New York: Seagull
Books, 2017), 43.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2019
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involved in an experiment like this know anything perfectly? Note that
Alma himself raises this question: “Is your knowledge perfect?” he asks,
apparently with reference to things apart from the seed’s goodness
(32:35). This time, he answers negatively (32:36). Apparently, we know
nothing apart from the seed’s being good (or not being good). That is
all we know. But again, let us be clear: a person can know that one thing,
according to Alma, and know it perfectly, surely, and really. We have a
foundation, a foothold. We know little, but we do know something. And
Alma claims that this little bit of knowledge will spur us to keep working,
encouraging the word to grow: “Ye will say: Let us nourish [the seed]
with great care, that it may get root, that it may grow up, and bring forth
fruit unto us” (32:37). This kernel of knowledge, minimal but sure, is
enough to mobilize one’s efforts with the seed. It is enough to solidify
one’s faith.
Here is the interesting thing: Alma says knowledge mobilizes one’s
further exercise of faith. When he asks if the experimenter’s knowledge
is perfect in general (rather than just “in that thing”), he answers, “Nay;
neither must ye lay aside your faith” (32:36). Here, crucially, faith goes
beyond knowledge. Faith’s first efforts, in fact, yield a bit of knowledge,
but it is minimal, just enough to spur us to invest our faith in the word
in a genuinely productive way. Knowledge, we might say, dawns early
rather than late in the experiment, and it arrives primarily so that we
will get to work seriously on the seed, or the word. Now, you might be
thinking to yourself, “Well, yes, we’ve got to keep working because we’ve
got only a bit of knowledge, and faith needs to keep experimenting
until our knowledge in general becomes perfect. We don’t lay aside faith
once we’ve got a bit of knowledge, true, but that’s because there’s a lot
more knowledge to come!” But here we must slow down and look carefully at the text. From this point to the end of the chapter, Alma never
again speaks of knowledge. Faith continues beyond knowledge—that is,
beyond knowledge of the seed’s goodness—but not because it aims at
producing more knowledge or more general knowledge. It apparently
aims at something else. And what does it aim at? Alma is perfectly clear
about this: faith aims at life, at eternal life.
Alma is explicit on this score. When he speaks of what to anticipate
from the seed, he refers to “the fruit of the tree of life” (32:40). He further
says, “If ye will nourish the word . . . , looking forward to the fruit thereof,
it shall take root; and behold it shall be a tree springing up unto everlasting life” (32:41). Echoing Lehi’s famous dream about the tree of life, he
also promises this: “By and by ye shall pluck the fruit” of this tree, “which
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is most precious, which is sweet above all that is sweet, and which is
white above all that is white, yea, and pure above all that is pure” (32:42).
Here, then, is what faith-beyond-knowledge aims at. It does not strive
for more knowledge; it strives toward life, life eternal. Knowledge is, in
Alma’s parable, a crucial but ultimately brief moment occurring early
in the long road of faith. It is also focused on just one tiny but essential
detail: whether or not the seed that one plants is good. Then knowledge
fades into the background as one chases after the good life, the life whose
goodness is signaled by the goodness of the seed that grows into a tree of
life. One hungers for life rather than for knowledge.
Let me pause here to highlight, for a moment, Alma’s theological
brilliance. Alma has laid out a path that begins with eating the fruit
from the tree of knowledge in the Garden of Eden, the tree that gives
knowledge specifically of good and evil. But then the path leads to a
tree of infinitely greater value, the tree of life. Although he does so subtly, Alma seems to build his whole parable as a sustained reflection on
the two trees in Eden. (Incidentally, I think that the common reading
of Alma 32, which regards faith as inferior in some way to knowledge
and therefore assumes that the parable is about progress from faith to
knowledge, makes it impossible to see Eden’s two trees clearly.)9 Alma
thus places his listeners and us as readers on a path that leads from the
real effects of eating from Eden’s first tree—its effect in this context is
that we can know perfectly whether the angelic announcement regarding Christ is good—to the anticipated experience of eating from Eden’s
second tree. From the bitter tree to the sweet tree (see 2 Ne. 2:15)—this,
I think, is what Alma 32 is about.
All this constitutes Alma’s belated response to Korihor. Korihor asked
how anyone can be certain about a religious tradition. Alma’s mature
answer has nothing to do with the complex and beautiful order of Creation, as does Alma 30. He instead argues in Alma 32 that one must
experiment with the word provided by the tradition and that one relatively quickly comes to know perfectly and certainly that the word is
good. In this way, Alma responds to Korihor’s skepticism first by providing a parable about what it looks like to know the goodness of the word.
9. For more on Edenic themes in Alma 32, see David E. Bokovoy, “The
Word and the Seed: The Theological Use of Biblical Creation in Alma 32,” Journal of Book of Mormon Studies 23 (2014): 1–21. These issues are also addressed
in Jenny Webb, “It Is Well That Ye Are Cast Out: Alma 32 and Eden,” in Miller,
Experiment on the Word, 43–56.
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It is possible to know. But even as he insists that religious knowledge is
a real possibility, Alma goes on to suggest that Korihor places too much
value on knowledge. Alma emphatically does not regard knowledge
as the end or the aim of one’s devotional efforts. Knowledge is, rather,
something of importance gained near the beginning of one’s journey
of faith. Knowledge therefore must be subordinated to life. Knowledge
serves as a spur to get one moving passionately in the direction of the
tree of life, but it cannot be itself the end or the aim of all things. If, like
Korihor, we privilege knowledge over life, our values are confused, and
they require serious reconsideration.
As anticipated, then, Alma’s response to Korihor is twofold. Korihor
is wrong to suggest that one cannot be certain about the goodness of a
tradition. But Korihor is also wrong to make knowledge the measuring
stick for everything, because the truly good life, life worth living for
eternity, is the real measuring stick.
For my part, I find Alma’s mature response to Korihor largely satisfying. He convinces me that life should be granted greater privilege over
knowledge, and he convinces me that knowledge of the religious real
is possible. But a critical reader must at this point confess that Alma’s
parable regarding the seed is at least partially problematic and partially
unsatisfying. Anyone struggling to know if the word offered by the Restoration is good, or anyone deeply worried about someone struggling
with such questions, likely feels as if Alma is hiding behind a metaphor.
He speaks of planting and swelling and growing and eating, but what do
these images mean in the context of real life? How do I come to know
that the word is good? According to Alma, I must “plant” it, but what
does it mean to plant the word? And Alma goes on to say that I should
watch to see whether the seed “swells” and “sprouts” and “begins to grow,”
but what does it look like for the word to do any of these things? Alma’s
parable is beautiful, but what, concretely, is it supposed to mean? Again,
for anyone going in circles about their own feelings and experiences, the
metaphor can feel too vague. And this is, I think, an entirely legitimate
concern. I also think, however, that Alma has a full and satisfying answer
to this worry, which is good news. That answer comes in Alma 36.10
10. The treatment of Alma 36 that follows relies heavily on the extended
analysis of the text I provide in Joseph M. Spencer, An Other Testament: On
Typology, 2d ed. (Provo, Utah: Neal A. Maxwell Institute, 2016), 2–7, 11–24.
Naturally, some of my own thinking about this chapter has developed beyond
what is available in this earlier discussion.
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Chapter 36 finds Alma talking with his son Helaman, his soon-to-be
successor in the Nephite church. Alma opens his words with encouragement to know, returning to the theme of chapters 30 and 32. “I beseech
of thee,” he says to Helaman, “that thou wilt hear my words and learn of
me; for I do know” (Alma 36:3). The moment he says he knows something, however, Alma appears to recognize that his son might have worries about what it means to know something in a religious vein. At any
rate, Alma backs up a step, offering a clarification I have already cited:
“I would not that ye think that I know of myself—not of the temporal
but of the spiritual, not of the carnal mind but of God” (36:4). Having
drawn these basic distinctions, Alma goes on to outline a kind of puzzle,
highlighting the ways in which spiritual knowledge can be confusing—
if not, in fact, paradoxical. “If I had not been born of God,” he explains,
“I should not have known these things; but God has, by the mouth of his
holy angel, made these things known unto me, not of any worthiness of
myself ” (36:5). This verse is strange. Alma seems to say first that he had
to be born of God in order to come to know certain things, but then
he adds that God went ahead and made them known to him regardless of whether he had been born of God (or at least regardless of his
worthiness).
These first verses from Alma 36 thus work together to raise a complex question, essentially equivalent to the question I have been asking
here: how does one come to know something religious with any certainty? But if the first verses of the chapter outline a question, then what
comes next provides a kind of answer; Alma 36:1–5 outlines a problem,
and then Alma 36:6–25 provides a solution. Interestingly, the solution
does not come in the form of a philosophical discourse or even a theological parable, but rather in the form of a personal story. What explains
knowledge is not theory but experience. Alma will tell how he came to
know, without relying on obscure metaphors. Further, he recommends
to Helaman that he come to know in the same way, indicating that anyone can have the same experience Alma did. Here, perhaps, we can get
a real sense for what it looks like to come to know, perfectly and surely,
that a religious word is good.
Alma therefore jumps into a well-known story—the story of when he
and the sons of Mosiah were going about “seeking to destroy the church
of God,” only to encounter a “holy angel” who spoke with “the voice of
thunder” (36:6–7). As Alma tells the story, this encounter had an immediate effect on him: he “fell to the earth” and “did hear no more” (36:10–
11). He collapsed while the world around him retreated into oblivion. The
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effect of the encounter was, in short, to trap Alma in his own head. At
the heart of Alma 36, therefore, we have an opportunity to see the inner
workings of the young man’s mind. His friends fade from the picture. His
physical surroundings fade away too. Even the angel disappears from
the text. All we have after the collapse is Alma’s singular psyche, for ten
verses (see 36:13–22).11 As we read, we are trapped with Alma in his head.
There is a point worth being quite clear about before going any further. I often hear it said that Alma’s conversion was unusual because it
was instigated by an angel. I think, though, that this is not quite right.
The angel indeed forces Alma to ask some hard questions, but the angel
does not convert him. If anything, in fact, the angel sends him into a
three-day spiral of depression. When Alma begins to come out of it,
interestingly, he says nothing about the angel. It is not the shock of a
sign-like angelic visit that forces Alma to know. There is something else,
something much more mundane at the heart of his conversion—of his
coming to know the goodness of the word. Alma is not an exception,
filled with knowledge simply because he got the sign Korihor wanted
so badly.
Since the reader is trapped in Alma’s head for ten verses here at the
center of Alma 36, it seems natural that this stretch of the text contains
repeating instances of the words “thought” and “memory.” Each of these
terms appears five times, and they are arranged largely in alternating
pairs: memory, thought, thought, memory, memory, thought, thought,
memory, memory, thought. As Alma tells the story of his three-day
psychological struggle, he seems to present it as a confrontation of sorts
between his thoughts and his memories. The whole episode unfolds in
five sequences, which we must track to develop a sense of how Alma
came to know the goodness of the word. He begins in a situation where
his memories and his thoughts cannot be reconciled, leaving him in
doubt and despair, but he then moves to a situation where his memories
and his thoughts are wholly reconciled, putting him in a position of
perfect knowledge regarding the goodness of the word. A full analysis
of these five sequences would require much more space than I can give
to them here, but even a brief treatment should clarify the meaning of
Alma’s metaphors from Alma 32.
11. By the end of verse 12, Alma has completely collapsed, and we are listening only to his thoughts. Beginning with verse 23, Alma is waking up and
re-encountering the world. It is only in verses 13–22 that Alma’s psyche takes
up the whole stage.
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At the beginning of the story, in the first sequence, Alma remembers just one sort of thing: “I did remember all my sins and iniquities” (36:13). The immediate result of this memory is torture: “I was
tormented with the pains of hell” (36:13). At this same point, the content
of Alma’s thought is similarly narrow. He speaks of “the very thought of
coming into the presence of my God,” which produces “inexpressible
horror” in him (36:14). Here, then, is where Alma begins. His memory,
the past as he sees it, initially focuses on only his sins and iniquities. His
thought concerns the future, a day of judgment, a reckoning in the presence of God. When these combine—a past of sin and a future of judgment—Alma experiences torment and horror. Thus, when the second
sequence opens, Alma tries out another thought: “Oh, thought I, that I
could be banished and become extinct” (36:15). Here he tries to replace
his first thought with another, a kind of antithought, a desperate wish
to cease existing. Unfortunately, it gets him nowhere. “Three nights” of
being “racked . . . with the pains of a damned soul” follow, marking the
futility of his attempt to escape from judgment (36:16). Note that Alma’s
memory, in the course of the second sequence, remains exactly the same
as in the first sequence: “I was harrowed up by the memory of my many
sins,” he repeats in verse 17.
The third sequence, however, marks an interesting change. First,
it opens with a new memory: “I remembered also,” Alma says (36:17,
emphasis added). This is quite a formula, I think. All of a sudden, Alma’s
memory expands. And what does he also remember at this point?
“Behold, I remembered also to have heard my father prophesy unto the
people concerning the coming of one Jesus Christ, a Son of God, to
atone for the sins of the world” (36:17). This is crucial. Alma remembers also, and what he remembers is the word. It must be emphasized
that Alma says nothing about the angel at this transitional point. The
word, which converts him, is the humble but prophetic word of his
father—something entirely mundane and yet so potently transformative. At any rate, this new memory immediately provides Alma with
a new thought—namely, “the coming of one Jesus Christ.” “My mind
caught hold upon this thought,” he tells us as the third sequence continues in verse 17. And this thought leads him to pray. “O Jesus, thou Son of
God,” he cries, pleading for mercy (36:18).
The fourth sequence follows quickly. “And now, behold, when I
thought this,” he says, referring back to his prayer (36:19). There is a
point here worth highlighting. At the end of the third sequence, Alma’s
thought remains abstract; it concerns the idea of Christ. At the beginning
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of the fourth sequence, however, Alma’s thought becomes concrete; it is
a direct prayer to Christ. What results from this new, concrete thought?
“I could remember my pains no more,” Alma says (36:19). This thought
has a particularly interesting consequence for Alma’s memory. In the
course of the fourth sequence, the additional memory of the third
sequence pushes out a problematic memory. Pain disappears from his
memory.
Then follows, at last, the fifth and final sequence of Alma’s story.
Once his thoughts are focused concretely on Christ, he says, “I was
harrowed up by the memory of my sins no more” (36:19). This is crucial, and it must be read carefully. Notice that the content of Alma’s
memory at this point is again, as in the first sequence, made up of his
past sins. His memory, what he sees as his past, has not changed in the
end, but his relationship to it has. The memory of his past was originally
a source of torment, but now, we are told, Alma is “harrowed up” by
that memory no more. He also says something about the state of his
thought at this point, but he puts that off for two verses in order to mark
the astonishing contrast between the moment before his prayer and the
moment after: “And oh, what joy, and what marvelous light I did behold;
yea, my soul was filled with joy as exceeding as was my pain! Yea, I say
unto you, my son, that there could be nothing so exquisite and so bitter as were my pains. Yea, and again I say unto you, my son, that on the
other hand, there can be nothing so exquisite and sweet as was my joy”
(36:20–21). These might be the two most beautiful verses in the Book of
Mormon.12 But then Alma follows them with a clarification of his final
thought: “Yea, methought I saw, even as our father Lehi saw, God sitting upon his throne . . . ; yea, and my soul did long to be there” (36:22).
Alma’s final thought too brings his story full circle. His thought is of the
future presence of God, just as in the first sequence. Here again, though,
while the thought is the same, Alma’s relationship to it is fundamentally
changed. Before, he was racked with “inexpressible horror.” Now, he
says, his “soul did long to be there”—there with God.
Now, somewhere in these five sequences, Alma gains real knowledge.
He makes this clear as soon as he tells of having woken up. “Because of
the word which [God] has imparted unto me,” he says, “many . . . do
know of these things of which I have spoken, as I do know; and the
12. It should be noted that these verses return to the imagery of Eden’s two
trees, especially as these are presented in 2 Nephi 2:15. They also reemphasize
the question of taste and its connection to knowledge.
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knowledge which I have is of God” (36:26). This sequence of thoughts
and memories has produced knowledge in Alma. And so the story in
Alma 36 helps us answer questions from the parable of the seed in chapter 32. Where in this story, then, does Alma’s knowledge dawn? Is it
possible to nail down the exact psychological content, so to speak, of his
metaphor about the seed? What does it mean to say that the seed swells
and sprouts and begins to grow?
It seems to me that the crucial possibility-creating moment occurs
when Alma “remembered also.” His soul, one could say, swells at exactly
that moment; the world—both the past world of Alma’s memory and
the future world of Alma’s anticipating thoughts—gets bigger. That
is the moment when the word—which was not given directly by the
angel, but more humbly by Alma’s father—has not just been planted
but in fact swells. What creates knowledge, however, comes a moment
later when the seed sprouts and begins to grow, which the word does in
a rather straightforward way in Alma’s autobiographical story. Alma’s
soul breaks open, and he cries out to Christ, who overwhelms him
with mercy.13 It is as he prays to Christ that he knows both the bitter and the sweet, that he feels as deeply as possible the absolute gulf
between the two experiences. When this yields in him a completely
different relationship to the past and to the future (although the past
and the future remain effectively the same), he knows. This, I think, is
Alma’s metaphor made plain and concrete.
I am struck that in Alma 37, still talking to Helaman, Alma says
the following about the sacred records Alma has kept (he is speaking
specifically about the brass plates): “They have enlarged the memory
of this people . . . and brought them to the knowledge of their God
unto the salvation of their souls” (37:8). This verse, it seems to me, provides a beautiful little formula for what Alma spells out in detail in
Alma 36. What does it mean for the word to swell, for one to feel swelling motions in one’s soul? It means that the word enlarges the memory,
helping a person to focus on the words of life they have heard. And this

13. George Handley has pointed out to me the possibility of locating Alma’s
knowledge in his experience of God’s love. There is little question that love has its
own kind of knowledge (as biblical metaphors make clear). While this is unquestionably a key part of any experience like Alma’s, it seems important to remain
within the ambit of Alma’s own lexicon, and he never himself refers to love in the
course of chapters 30, 32, and 36.
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inaugurates a process that quickly brings the individual to know Christ
and his goodness.
Thus might anyone come to know religious truth. And I wish to
say in my own name that I believe this is real. “Is not this real?” That is
Alma’s question, but now I say: Yes, it is real. We can know, can know of
the goodness of the word that has been given to us. In this I find I have
a reason to hope, a “cause to believe,” as Alma puts it (32:18). With Alma,
I want to say that I know. I know the word is good. And the word gets
me moving in the direction of sustaining life. I do not know much, to
be sure, but I know—and I believe I know this with real and indelible
certainty—I know that the word of Christ is good. Alma’s word, Nephi’s
word, Moroni’s word, Joseph Smith’s word—these are good words. They
bear fruit in me. And that is enough—that is knowledge enough. There
is one thing I think I can say I know without qualification. My memory
has been enlarged—in my case, most especially by the Book of Mormon—and consequently I have felt the abyss between pain and joy,
between the bitter and the sweet. That abyss is real. Like daylight from
dark night, the word divides my past experience in two. There is before,
and there is after. I remember my sins, but the thought of God’s presence fills me with longing.
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